

Robust vote sampling in a P2P media distribution system

Rameez Rahman, David Hales, Michel Meulpolder, Vincent Heinink, Johan Pouwelse, Henk Sips

Dept. of Computer Science
Technical University of Delft, Netherlands
Email: rrameez@gmail.com

Abstract—The explosion of freely available media content through BitTorrent file sharing networks over the Internet means that users need guides or recommendations to find the right, high quality, content. Current systems rely on centralized servers to aggregate, rate and moderate metadata for this purpose. We present the design and simulations, using real BitTorrent traces, for a method combining fully decentralized metadata dissemination, vote sampling and ranking for deployment in the Tribler.org BitTorrent media client. Our design provides robustness to spam attacks, where metadata does not reflect the content it is attached to, by controlling metadata spreading and by vote sampling based on a collusion proof *experience* function. Our design is light-weight, fully decentralized and offers good performance and robustness under realistic conditions.

I. INTRODUCTION

The BitTorrent protocol has transformed the distribution of large media files due to its decentralized, scalable, efficient and robust peer-to-peer (P2P) architecture [1]. Peers share bandwidth to help distribute files of common interest. However, the protocol excludes mechanisms for searching, rating, and associating descriptive metadata to, content.

Consequently, to locate high quality content available for download, users often rely on web-based systems that provide both links to content (.torrent files) and associated metadata such as a text description, a thumbnail graphic, a URL to associated information on the web and other useful information. This allows users to search and browse available content before making a selection of what to download.

Web-based systems rely on user contributions of both .torrent files, that point to available content, and metadata that describes content. They are administered centrally so malicious content or incorrect metadata can be manually removed and the users who posted them excluded. Creating new identities in such systems involves some level of user cost since identities must be created on the web system prior to posting information. Hence such systems cannot entirely stop anti-social behavior but they make it costly because creating new user identities involves some time and effort.

A number of BitTorrent clients have, recently, integrated their own search and metadata systems such that users can locate and browse available content conveniently from within the client before downloading (e.g. Vuze¹ and Miro²). However,

again, these rely on centrally administered servers to store and and serve metadata requiring the creation of user accounts.

In this paper we propose a design for a fully distributed metadata dissemination and rating system which provides similar functionality to centralized systems. Low quality metadata such as spam or incorrect information is combated through a distributed ranking system based on the sampling of user votes.

Our approach is a major step towards a completely decentralized, and self-maintaining, BitTorrent media sharing community³.

As with centralized systems we do not eliminate the possibility of anti-social behavior but we make it costly and difficult without the need for central servers or administration.

The target platform for our design is the Tribler⁴ media client [13] but the design is generic enough that it should be applicable in other media sharing contexts where decentralized and robust metadata dissemination and rating are required. Tribler implements a non-spoofable distributed peer identity system using a public key infrastructure. This means that all communication between nodes is signed and bound to a known source identity, thus preventing forged or stolen identities. Also, the Tribler client provides local database services allowing state to be maintained over sessions.

The paper is structured as follows. In section II we give an overview of the system. In section III we briefly discuss the peer sampling service (PSS) - which provides an essential service required by our design. In section IV we describe our metadata dissemination mechanism. In section V we present our vote sampling approach and in section VI we present simulation results based on real BitTorrent peer traces. In section VII we discuss some vulnerabilities and possible refinements of our design. In section VIII we present a summary of related work. Finally we conclude with a summary of our contribution and possible future work.

II. DESIGN

In this section we describe, in outline, the overall design of our system giving the reasons for our main choices.

We require a method by which nodes in a P2P file sharing system can submit, distribute and rank metadata while

³Which would also require the use of a decentralised tracker. This is an active area of research and there are also deployed versions in use but this is beyond the scope of this paper.

⁴<http://tribler.org>

¹<http://vuze.com>

²<http://www.getmiro.com/>

respecting the constraints of: Full decentralisation requiring no servers or centralised components; Scalability to millions of nodes; Resistance to malicious attacks which attempt to display spam metadata to the user.

In order to propagate and store metadata we selected a gossip (or epidemic) based replication approach. Each peer stores metadata in its own local database. By storing metadata locally we ensure that it has high availability. Periodically peers are paired randomly and exchange metadata updating their own local databases (section III discusses the PSS mechanism used). We selected a gossip based design because it requires no central components and is robust to high churn rates [3]. We could have stored metadata in a Distributed Hash Table but these require explicit leave and join operations which are costly in systems with high churn, such as file sharing networks [14]. Additionally, search performance is considerably enhanced if metadata is stored locally because it is not necessary to perform multi-hop look-ups. It could be argued that such a system is not scalable. However, as we discuss in Section IV, the recency and random policy of metadata dissemination should ensure that most peers discover most of the files in the system.

We require that users can “vote” on metadata indicating if they consider it to be of high quality (a positive vote) or spam (a negative vote) and that these votes can be communicated to other nodes such that they can be used for ranking items after a user search. Here we made two design decisions influenced by security and efficiency concerns.

Firstly we decided to bind votes not to metadata items (which we term “moderations”) but to the users who created them (which we term “moderators”). Our thinking here is that moderators will either tend to be good or bad - i.e. to create quality moderations or spam moderations. Also this makes more efficient use of user input, since it is known that users rarely vote or moderate items in file sharing networks⁵. We cannot expect each moderation to obtain sufficient votes to rank them. However, given a small number of active moderators and a large number of moderations, the few votes made by users, when bound to moderators, can produce sufficient quantity for meaningful ranking.

Secondly we decided, for security reasons, to only count votes from nodes encountered directly via the PSS. Hence we sample the population randomly rather than aggregating votes using gossip based aggregation methods [8]. This ensures that each node can only vote once for any moderator (a one node one vote per moderator policy). The downside of this decision is that each node requires sufficient time to obtain a good sample and also that different nodes will have different samples at any given time. Hence we trade speed and efficiency for security.

In order to frustrate spam moderators we utilize a distributed mechanism based on an *experience function* which imposes a cost on new identities before their votes are accepted by other

⁵Based on data from YouTube and a popular Bittorrent public tracker community, mininova.org, we found typically no more than five user votes per 1000 views or downloads

nodes. However, this cost would be incurred anyway by a normal functioning node in a file sharing network (uploading files to others). Hence we do not impose an artificial cost that would degrade the efficiency of the system. The experience function is presented in section V-B. Here we trade some extra protocol complexity for security against spam attacks where many cheap identities are used to vote up a spam moderation.

III. PEER SAMPLING SERVICE

We assume each peer has access to a peer sampling service (PSS) which periodically returns a random peer from the entire population of online peers. This allows nodes to discover others and potentially exchange messages with them.

There are several ways to implement a PSS in a distributed and robust way. One approach uses *gossiping or epidemic protocols*. Such approaches maintain a random-like overlay network in which nodes regularly exchange their neighbor lists (or view) with others. Such PSS protocols have been shown to be robust, self-repairing, completely decentralized and scalable to tens of millions of nodes [9].

Our target system, the already deployed Tribler system, implements a variant of Newscast [7] called BuddyCast [13].

IV. METADATA DISSEMINATION

In this section, we will describe how metadata is disseminated in our system. The low level details of the metadata dissemination protocol, called ModerationCast, and extensive simulations, are given in [6]. Here we present the main features relevant to the voting mechanisms described later.

Moderations are disseminated in a gossip-like fashion to other peers by using the PSS. However, nodes only pass on metadata from those moderators they have approved. Approval involves the user explicitly selecting a thumbs-up icon displayed next to the metadata from the given moderator indicating a positive (+) vote for the moderator. Users may also disapprove of a moderator by selecting a thumbs-down indicating a negative (-) vote.

Over time as nodes encounter others, through the PSS, they will receive new moderations either directly from the moderator, if they encounter them, or from those nodes which have approved the moderator. Received moderations are stored in a local database. Hence highly approved moderators will tend to spread their metadata more quickly than moderators that are not highly approved. If no other node approves a moderator then the only way that its metadata can spread is through direct contact with other nodes. Nodes that disapprove a moderator remove all associated moderations from their local database and refuse any new moderations from that moderator.

Essentially then, the idea is that, “good” moderators, as judged by the approval of others, will spread their metadata quickly but “bad” moderators, obtaining low numbers of approvals and / or disapprovals, will only be able to spread their metadata slowly. However, it is important to note that even bad moderators can spread their data to others through direct interactions with nodes that have not already indicated disapproval. Figure 2 shows a schematic diagram showing how

```

do forever
wait Δ
j ← GetRandomNode()
mli ← Extract(local_db)
Send mli to j
mlj ← Receive(j)
local_db ← Merge(local_db, mlj)

```

(a) active thread

```

do forever
mli ← receive(*)
mli ← Extract(local_db)
Send mli to i
local_db ← Merge(local_db, mli)

```

(b) passive thread

Fig. 1. The push / pull gossip based metadata dissemination protocol. GetRandomNode is supplied by the PSS. The local_db stores received moderations. The Extract() function returns the moderations list (ml) sent to other nodes. The Merge() function inserts new moderations into the local_db. These operations take account of local node votes and moderation recency criteria.




Fig. 2. Diagram illustrating how moderations spread from a moderator node that creates the metadata (m) and nodes that give the moderator positive votes (+). Shaded nodes have received and stored the metadata in their local_db. Nodes that give negative votes (-) or no votes (null) do not pass on the metadata.

a moderation spreads in the population based on approvals and disapprovals by other nodes.

To authenticate moderations we use digital signatures. This prevents alteration of moderations by malicious peers. Figure 1 shows outline pseudocode for the gossip based metadata dissemination protocol.

V. VOTE SAMPLING

In this section we describe how votes are sampled and collected by peers in the network. We designed two related protocols: BallotBox and VoxPopuli and an associated *experience function*.

These protocols support a two-tier identity system because the population is partitioned into an experienced core and an inexperienced periphery. Figure 4 illustrates this view of the system schematically.

Figure 3 shows outline pseudocode for the two protocols. We describe each in turn below.

A. BallotBox protocol

As previously stated votes are generated by users registering approval (a positive vote) or disapproval (a negative vote) against moderators. Each peer node stores a list of the votes the local user has made in a structure we term the *local vote list*. Each entry in the local vote list contains a pair mapping a unique moderator ID to a vote (either positive or negative) plus a time stamp indicating when the user made the vote. Moderators may only appear once in the list since a user is

only allowed to make one vote against each unique moderator. The length of the list therefore indicates the total number of votes cast by the local user. It is a record of their local voting pattern. It can be thought of as a ballot paper that the users fill in as they make votes.

Periodically each node i selects another node j from the population randomly (using the PSS). Each node then applies an experience function E to the other to determine if to request the local vote list of the other (section V-B below discusses the E function in detail). Requested nodes communicate their local vote list to the other. Nodes send a maximum of 50 votes, selecting them based on a recency and random policy. Experiments demonstrated that combining these policies produced acceptable performance [6]. Nodes then merge received vote lists into a structure we term the *local ballot box*. The local ballot box is a list in which each entry contains four items: mapping a unique moderator ID to a vote, a time stamp and a unique peer ID. The local ballot box is similar in format to the local vote list except that moderators may appear several times in the list, recording votes for the same moderator received from different peers. Also the time stamp records when the vote was received, by the local node, rather than made by the remote node.

Essentially then, each peer individually conducts its own poll by asking other randomly selected peers directly to supply their local vote list. Hence pairs of peers meet randomly and exchange votes, building, over time, a sample of the votes of the population in their local ballot boxes.

Nodes do not forward or share the accumulated information in their local ballot box with other peers. This precludes certain kinds of malicious vote manipulation where a node could lie about the votes received from others. But this means that each peer can only accumulate a sample of the population votes, based on its direct experience, not a globally accurate total count. Faster and more accurate epidemic-style aggregation protocols have been proposed but they are highly vulnerable to lying behaviour [8].

The local ballot box has a maximum size of B_{max} votes from unique peers - beyond which new votes replace the oldest votes. Hence BallotBox determines voting statistics from a maximum sample of B_{max} other peers. Assuming the PSS produces random samples and B_{max} is large enough then we can expect the local cache to converge to a reasonable accuracy.

The BallotBox protocol, therefore, is similar to an “opinion poll” as carried out by polling organisations when attempting to determine the opinion of an entire population on some matter of interest. In general such polls ask individuals directly their own opinion but not what they believe others opinions are. The BallotBox turns every peer into a pollster enquiring on moderators.

Based on the current contents of the local ballot box a peer can calculate a ranking of moderators. This, in turn, can be used to rank metadata items to which the moderators are bound. In order to take the raw votes from the local ballot box and produce a ranking of moderators any suitable method




Fig. 3. The BallotBox and Voxpopuli protocols comprise one active (a) and two passive threads (b and c). Notice the active thread always executes the BallotBox protocol but only conditionally executes the VoxPopuli protocol - when the number of unique votes in the ballot box is below some threshold B_{min} . The passive thread (c) only responds with a top-K list when that node j is itself *not* executing VoxPopuli. This prevents nodes unwittingly passing potentially malicious top-K lists received from others.

could be applied such as simple summation or more complex proportional approaches. We do not discuss this further here.

Another possible use for the vote sample information is to display a screen listing the top-K moderators themselves along with their estimated percentage of the popular vote and other associated information. We believe such a screen could psychologically incentivise moderators to produce good moderations since they can see themselves rise in the ranks of listed moderators as others vote for them.

B. Experience function

Since new identities are cheap in our system, immediate voting power would enable Sybil [4] and collusive flash crowd attacks (where a large number of new peers join the system with the explicit aim of promoting a moderator by voting for them for nefarious purposes). We therefore enforce that new nodes joining the system cannot register votes with others until they are considered “experienced” by the receiving nodes. In other words, any node should only take a vote from another node into account when this other node is experienced.

We define the general *experience function* as a binary function E that determines whether or not a node is considered to be experienced. Any candidate E function must be implementable in a fully distributed way and be robust to attempts to fake experience (i.e. to immediately and cheaply generate experienced identities). While the overall design of our voting system does not assume a particular definition of experience, in the implementation that we will present in this paper we consider a node experienced when it has contributed a certain amount of data to the peer population by sharing files.

In order to determine the contribution of a node in a safe way we use the BarterCast protocol [11], which is deployed in the Tribler system. In essence, by using BarterCast, any node in the system can estimate the contribution of any other node (that it knows via the PSS) based on up- and download statistics that are exchanged among nodes in a reliable way. First, nodes record statistics of their own BitTorrent file-transfers. Second, nodes exchange their own direct statistics

with other peers they encounter. Based on these combined statistics each peer can build a graph of the network with directed edges that denote the amount of MBs transferred from one node to another node. The protocol then applies a maxflow algorithm to derive peer contributions. The maxflow approach highly reduces the effect of (collaborations of) nodes that provide false information in order to fake experience. This approach and its properties are described in detail in [5] and [11].

In the remainder of this paper, we assume that node i can compute a reliable *contribution value* for a node j . We denote the contribution of j to i by $f_{i \rightarrow j}$. For the purposes of implementing our experience function E , we apply a simple threshold value T over the contribution function $f_{j \rightarrow i}$. Hence node i considers node j to be experienced where:

$$E_i(j) = \begin{cases} true & \text{iff } f_{j \rightarrow i} \geq T; \\ false & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

In our current design we determined an appropriate T value via simulations based on real BitTorrent traces (see section VI). However, as we discuss later, T could be adapted dynamically to adjust to differing conditions.

C. VoxPopuli protocol

The BallotBox protocol involves nodes constructing a sample of votes based on direct interaction with individual peers, who are considered experienced. Therefore, new nodes entering the system need time to build a reasonably sized sample before they can extract meaningful statistics. A minimum sample size of B_{min} votes from other peers is required before any statistics are used. This is to avoid artefacts produced by extremely low vote samples. During this bootstrapping process nodes use the VoxPopuli protocol - a less accurate but speedier protocol which dispenses with the need for individual vote counting or the application of an experience function.

When executing the VoxPopuli, nodes request from others (encountered via the PSS) a rank list of the top-K moderators. No experience function is applied. Only those nodes which are *not* themselves executing VoxPopuli respond based on their current local ballot box statistics - by producing a ranked list of moderators truncated to a maximum size of K and sending this to the requesting node.

Each node executing VoxPopuli maintains a local cache of the last V_{max} top-K lists received and performs a merge operation to produce its own top-K list which is used for relevance ranking. There is no minimum sample size required so after the first VoxPopuli exchange a node can rank moderators.

Any rank merging method could be used. We apply simple averaging of the rank of each moderator over all stored top-K lists. Where a moderator does not appear in a list they are assumed to have rank $K+1$ for that list.

VoxPopuli is therefore quick (in the order of a few seconds) but vulnerable to inexperienced and colluding malicious peers - if a sufficient number enter the system such that they form a large enough proportion of the total peer population and they promote the same spam moderators.




Fig. 4. Diagram illustrating the concept of a peer population comprising an experienced core of nodes and new nodes entering the system. Over time new nodes will enter the experienced core as other nodes recognise them as experienced.

VI. SIMULATION RESULTS

In order to test our proposed design we performed simulations based on real traces from the private BitTorrent tracker *filelist.org*. It is possible to trace the behavior of unique peers over multiple sessions and multiple swarms with this tracker. This is not possible with public trackers such as *mininova.org*. The traces record the size of the files that are shared in each swarm, and uptimes, downtimes and the connectability of peers (i.e. if they are behind a firewall or freely connectable).

The traces capture the realistic high churn rates found in deployed P2P systems. On average only 50% of the total population of nodes are online at any given time⁶. For our simulations we used a dataset of 10 unique traces of 7 day duration monitoring 100 unique peers. Each trace records approximately 23,000 unique events making a total of 23×10^4 events⁷.

Our simulations operate at the BitTorrent file piece level. This means we simulate every action that a BitTorrent client would need to take, down to the exchange of file chunks, peer choking and piece selection. The individual actions of each node correspond to those that any obedient Bittorrent client would undertake while downloading a file in a swarm. We simulate nodes that are predisposed to seed files altruistically after they have downloaded and those which free-ride by leaving swarms as soon as they have downloaded their file. Such detailed simulations are non-trivial to implement and require significant computational power to run.

In the following sections we perform simulation experiments that demonstrate: The generation of an experienced core - section VI-A; The performance of vote sampling protocols - section VI-B; The performance of the system under spam attacks by a massive number of colluders who attempt to promote spam metadata - section VI-C.

⁶By total population we mean all nodes that enter the system - for however long - over the seven day period of the traces.

⁷The datasets used, and associated documentation, are publicly available at: <http://davidhales.com/tom-data.zip>.

A. Experience formation

We used trace based simulations to determine how quickly our system would produce an experienced core for given threshold values T for the experience function E (as described in section V-B). In order to gain a general picture of the formation of experience between nodes we calculated a time series for a value we term the Collective Experience Value (CEV). Since E is a binary and non-symmetrical function that can be applied to any pair of ordered nodes we calculated the average of E applied to all ordered pairs of nodes i, j where $E_i(j) = true$ contributes a value of 1 and $E_i(j) = false$ contributes a value of zero, hence:

$$e_i(j) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{iff } E_i(j) = true; \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

$$CEV = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i \in N} \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{e_i(j)}{N-1}$$

where N is the known total population size⁸.

The CEV is therefore a form of directed graph density value in which edges are defined between nodes based on the experience function E . It characterises the amount of experience between nodes. Figure 5 shows simulation results based on a typical trace from the dataset for various threshold values T . We conducted these series of experiments in order to ascertain the time required for the generation of a sizeable experienced core for different T values.

Based on the results shown in figure 5 we selected the lower value of $T = 5$ MB for use in the further simulation experiments discussed below. This value was chosen pragmatically. The results indicate that approximately 20% of ordered node pairs produce experience within 12 hours. This indicates the early formation of a core but implies a time and upload cost is necessary before a node can enter it. This frustrates Sybil or flash crowd attacks while placing only modest costs on honest new peers entering the system.

Note, however, that even after seven days (168 hours) some nodes are still not part of the core. This is due to freeriding behaviour in which nodes download but upload little⁹ and the fact that some nodes are rarely present in the trace - they may enter and quickly leave the system spending most of the time offline. As stated previously, analysis of the traces indicated that churn rates are high with approximately 50% of nodes offline at any given time. This indicates the traces reflect actual BitTorrent client file sharing dynamics. It is important to note that the results in figure 5 show results for all peer nodes that comprise the total population over the seven day period not just those who are online at any given time. It therefore gives a global picture of the traced population rather than online snapshots.

⁸The CEV value is therefore a measurement requiring global information and could not be calculated by individual nodes easily. We use our global knowledge of the traces to calculate the CEV value for our own experimental purposes. CEV plays no part in the protocols running in the nodes.

⁹Analysis of the traces showed that approximately 25% of peers uploaded little to others.




Fig. 5. Chart showing the Collective Experience Value (CEV) over time for a typical trace of BitTorrent activity. The CEV indicates the proportion of all ordered pairs of nodes (i, j) for which i considers j to be experienced. Hence when $CEV=1$ all nodes consider all others to be experienced. Results using five different threshold (T) values for the experience function E are shown.

B. Vote sampling

We tested the vote sampling protocols by running simulations in which a small number of moderators spread metadata and are allocated votes from other nodes when they receive this metadata. We set the first three nodes (M1, M2 and M3) entering the system to be moderators and to spread a moderation related to a .torrent file. We selected 10% of the population at random to provide a positive vote for M1 and 10% to provide a negative vote for M3. M2 gets no votes. Hence the correct ordering, based on the popular vote, should be $M1 > M2 > M3$.

For the BallotBox we set $B_{min} = 5$ and $B_{max} = 100$. The VoxPopuli cache size was set to $V_{max} = 10$ and for the top-K moderator lists $K = 3$.

The results for a typical run are shown in Figure 6. Notice that at approximately 12 hours there is a sharp rise. This is result of the bootstrapping properties of the VoxPopuli protocol. Recall that VoxPopuli allows nodes which have not yet received at least B_{min} votes to determine an ordering of moderators by randomly sampling the population requesting the top-K moderators from others who have received at least B_{min} votes. The steep rise indicates that a number of nodes have obtained these thresholds and can thus spread the top-K moderators to others. Hence nodes who have attained the required BallotBox sample size, since they have received enough votes from core nodes, share their rankings with new nodes entering the system - who cannot distinguish core nodes from other new nodes.

C. Spam attack

A major threat to our system is an attack on new normal nodes - those which have not yet received at least B_{min} votes from core nodes but act honestly - by a flash crowd of new nodes promoting a spam moderator. Such a flash crowd could be comprised of colluding nodes or the result of a Sybil [4]




Fig. 6. Chart showing the effectiveness of the vote sampling system over time. The correct ordering is $M1 > M2 > M3$ based on votes. Voting nodes do not vote until they receive the appropriate moderations via the moderation dissemination protocol. Three typical runs are shown for different independent traces. The average is over 10 independent runs.

attack in which a single node creates and maintains multiple identities. In either case it is clear that if the size of the spam crowd is significantly larger than the online experienced core then the spam attack will be successful against newly entering normal nodes. However, over time, new nodes will recover from the attack when they have obtained at least $B_{min} = 5$ votes in their local ballot box. So correctly functioning new nodes will only be vulnerable to such an attack for some initial period of time. Figure 7 illustrates this kind of attack diagrammatically.

Figure 8 gives results from simulations based on the 10 traces. However, here we fixed 30 nodes to be part of the experienced core. We set the flash crowd size to 30 and 60 in size. As can be seen when the flash crowd is 2 x core size (60) then most new nodes are defeated (polluted by a spam moderator - M0) for approximately 24 hours. When the flash crowd is 1 x core size then only a minority of nodes are defeated initially.

VII. DISCUSSION

The claim that the experience mechanism can discourage spam rests on two assumptions: 1) that the experienced core, over time, will become large and be populated by non-spam (or non-spam voting) nodes and 2) that spam nodes will not be able or prepared to pay the upload cost to join the experienced core.

Our first assumption is based on the idea that a population only becomes desirable for spamming if it is already large and that any small population that is already infected by spam nodes will not become large since users will go elsewhere and join other more productive communities. Hence we believe it is not unrealistic to assume that the founders (or elders) of any successful peer community are unlikely to be malicious. To put this another way, no successful community can form if the founders are malicious.




Fig. 7. Diagram illustrating a flash crowd attack on a population comprising an experienced core plus other newly arrived nodes. Dotted arrows show the flow of protocol messages between subpopulations: VoxPopuli (VP) and BallotBox (BB). Notice that the flash crowd cannot influence the experienced core because core nodes do not consider new nodes to be experienced. Over time newly entered normal nodes will eventually become experienced and enter the core.




Fig. 8. Results of a spam attack. The population comprises an experienced core, a collusive flash crowd plus other newly arrived normal nodes. At the start of the run the entire core is converged on a top moderator M1. The flash crowd promote M0 as top moderator (representing a spam moderator). Lines show the proportion of newly arrived nodes ranking M0 top for different sizes of the flash crowd relative to the core size. For attack sizes smaller than 1 x core size, zero pollution is obtain within the first hour. Averages of 10 trace runs are shown.

Our second assumption relies on the fact that to gain enough experienced identities to influence the popular vote the spam nodes would need to pay a high price in time and upload bandwidth - a price that would be too high to make an attack worthwhile. The larger the size of the core the higher the cost of an attack since more spam identities are needed to influence the vote. As we have demonstrated, even if the number of new malicious identities are equal in size to the existing core their voting influence is limited. Here we benefit from scaling - the larger the core the better the defence against attack.

However, if a sufficiently large set of colluding identities are willing to pay the cost, then our system can be defeated.

We selected a T value using global information and traces of

past activity. A more robust approach would adapt the T value endogenously based on experience. One possible approach involves nodes starting with a threshold $T = 0$ and adapting it based on the incoming votes. It is reasonable to suppose that honest peers would have the same opinion on the reliability of moderators. We could choose a maximum dispersion level of opinion in votes, D_{max} , above which we increase T . If incoming votes result in an increase in the dispersion level and take it above D_{max} , the value of T is increased and vice versa. The basic idea is that nodes respond to what they deem to be malicious attacks because dispersion in voting may indicate the presence of malicious peers in the system. By increasing T , peers would look to shield themselves from the votes of newcomers and place their trust in more experienced members of the tribe or community. We aim to explore adaptive T values in future work.

Another potential flaw in our approach is that *it is possible to fake experience* by clever collusion within the BarterCast protocol but this is difficult and again costly [11]. This is a variant of the so-called “front peer” or “mole” attack [5]

VIII. RELATED WORK

In the literature, the work that bears greatest resemblance to ours in its goals is Credence presented by Walsh et al. [16]. Credence is deployed on top of the Gnutella file sharing network. No metadata dissemination system is present in Credence, instead it relies on the underlying pull based mechanism of the Gnutella protocol for content search. Rather than voting on moderators, peers vote on files in the system. A peer X can evaluate another peer Y’s votes based on the correlation in the voting histories of the two peers. Further, apart from simple pairwise matching, peers can leverage the correlations discovered by other peers and compute their own correlations with distant peers by executing a flow-based algorithm. Using this approach, users who don’t vote, or do so only minimally, have no way of distinguishing between honest and malicious voters. This is evident from the results presented in [16] where nearly fifty percent of clients are isolated and have no correlations with other peers. In contrast our system doesn’t rely on a large number of people voting, yet still works for all peers, regardless of their voting habits.

System models, analysis, and performance evaluation of unstructured self-managing rating systems (UMR) and structured supervising rating (SSR) systems are presented by Tian et al. [15]. UMR is implemented in unstructured networks where every peer stores its rating of other peers on its superpeer. While, in SSR, each peer has a supervisor peer which is responsible for storing other peers’ rating of that particular peer. Each supervisor node is located using a DHT [14] based algorithm.

Our approach of data dissemination and storage is based on a push-pull gossip approach which differs from both these approaches. Furthermore, like most work on ratings, their approach assumes that all peers will issue ratings after each transaction with other peers. Additionally, they give a detailed account of a “personalized credibility sub-system” which

bears some resemblance to our experience function. Each peer, i , maintains a personalized credibility set that contains the peers who vote honestly on i . However, unlike our system, ratings from outside the credibility set are also accepted albeit with lower weights. This approach also differs from ours in how it deals with new peers. While we bootstrap the new peers with randomly sampled top-K ratings (see section V-C), [15] presents no method for bootstrapping new peers.

Kamvar et al. present EigenTrust [10] that uses an algorithm which is similar to the PageRank algorithm by Google [12]. It provides globally consistent trust values for peers in a network using DHT techniques. However, it assumes a stable network of peers thus making it unsuitable to networks with high churn. Damiani et al. present a system in which peers ask for ratings on particular peers by broadcasting poll messages [2]. This is basically a UMR system. Xiong et al. present the PeerTrust system [17], in which ratings on a peer are maintained by its supervising peer. This makes it an SSR system in the terminology of [15]. Such “supervisory” systems, due to high churn rates and the unreliable nature of real world systems, are often impractical and not suitable for real world implementation and deployment in open file sharing systems.

IX. CONCLUSION

We have presented the design and simulations of a metadata dissemination and ranking system applicable to the deployed Tribler P2P media client. Three protocols were introduced: ModerationCast, BallotBox and VoxPopuli. They work together to spread and rate metadata robustly.

We aimed to produce a light-weight, self-organising and robust design that is realistic enough to be deployed and requires zero server support. Our work is a major stepping stone towards a fully distributed and self-maintaining BitTorrent community that doesn't require the use of central moderators and servers.

We have built on existing deployed protocols BuddyCast and BarterCast to provide a peer sampling service (PSS) and a robust experience function.

However, we consider our design to be generic enough that other PSS protocols and experience functions could be used. Specifically any distributed trust metric that can rate nodes in a robust way could be adapted as basis for an experience function and hence can be used to support a robust distributed vote sampling model.

We have discussed the vulnerabilities in our approach and indicated why we consider these to be tolerable in realistic environments. We also indicated some future lines of research that may address some open issues. We aim to work on the adaptive threshold T , in order to make our design more robust against attacks.

To our knowledge Tribler is currently the only deployed P2P file sharing system using a fully distributed PSS to augment the BitTorrent protocol to provide proactive media discovery and seeding incentives [11]. To this we add a fully distributed metadata dissemination and rating system.

As of writing, we have integrated our code into the Tribler codebase. In the next major release of Tribler, we shall be able to test our proposed mechanism in a real deployed environment and obtain measurements directly from the live system.

X. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work was partially supported by the EU within the Framework 7 programme under the projects P2P-Next and QLectives.

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