Cooperation's Sensitivity to Network Structure: The Case of Individual Learning


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
#### Overview

Interpretation of Cooperation
Conflicting results (across fields)
Context-Preservation in Evolutionary IPD games
Opinion Dynamics on Networks
The Proposed Model
Results
Summary

#### Interpretation of Cooperation

#### Cooperation, as in the IPD game (A 'strategic' interpretation)





(The Prisoner's Dilemma)

# Context-Preservation in Evolutionary IPD games

#### The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

**Repeated Encounters** Memory Axelrod's Tournament x 2 **Strategies** "ALLD" is very strong. "TFT" is surprisingly strong. **Theoretical Results** Finite versus Infinite Series TAG-based systems, etc.

#### The Evolution of Cooperation

#### Cohen-Axelrod-Riolo (CAR):

The Role of Social Structure in the Maintenance of Cooperative Regimes

How can cooperation (~trust) evolve spontaneously in a population of selfish agents? I.e., in the IPD framework?

Memory length=1, 4 strategies studied:
ALLC (C, C, C)
TFT (C, C, D)
ATFT (D, D, C)
ALLD (D, D, D)


Agents are assigned a (uniform) random initial strategy.

Various (interaction) network topologies explored ~ average degree of *k* 

- In each round, each agent plays with each of its neighbors.
- A 4-shots IPD game for each link.


#### **Evolutionary** adaptation:

At the end of the round, agents copy the strategy of their most successful neighbors.



May 27 2006

On a 2-dimensional torus



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On a 2-dimensional WS-graph (see later)

#### The Essence of the CAR-results

Cooperation can indeed emerge spontaneously <u>Context-preservation</u> is key:

- The exact structure is not important.
- <u>Stability</u> is what matters.
  - \_ Dynamic versus Static networks.
- Depends on the particular values for T, S, P, R ~ k.

(The CAR-results apply to a wider set of strategies than discussed here.)

(Works by others show that the <u>heterogeneity</u> in the May 2 degree distribution plays a significant role as well.)

## **Opinion Dynamics on Networks**

#### Discrete Choices on Networks

An Ising-type model

 Rooted in Discrete Choice Theory (*de facto* standard in econometrics)


Agents make repeated individual choices from a discrete set C. (|C|=2)

Heterogeneous properties:

Individual biases can be/are typically taken into account

In lack of these, two regimes based on a 'certainty' parameter

#### **Discrete Choices on Networks**



#### Discrete Choices on Networks #2

Adding social influence


- Mean-field approach (Aoki, Brock & Durlauf)
- Localized interactions (Dugundji & Gulyas)


 Localized interactions define a network:
 Special individual-level biases, based on previous decisions of neighbors (in a network).

The system-level, aggregate outcome is sensitive to the network structure!

#### Watts-Strogatz Networks


Low average path-length ('*a small-world...'*) High level of clustering (`a friend of a friend is a friend...')






#### Watts-Strogatz Networks


Low average path-length ('a small-world...')
 High level of clustering
 ('a friend of a friend is a friend...')





#### Discrete Choices on Networks #3

Average values after 20000 iterations for 10x10 runs



## The Proposed Model: A possible way of reconciliation

Context-Preservation Revisited: The Case of Individual Learning Memory length=1, 4 strategies studied: • Agents have individual probabilities for all 4 strategies.

Agents are assigned a (uniform) random initial strategy.

`ALLC': `TFT': `ATFT': `ALLD': [p, (1-p)/3, (1-p)/3, (1-p)/3] [(1-p)/3, p, (1-p)/3, (1-p)/3] [(1-p)/3, (1-p)/3, p, (1-p)/3] [(1-p)/3, (1-p)/3, (1-p)/3, p]

#### Context-Preservation Revisited: The Case of Individual Learning #2

We study Watts-Strogatz networks only


- Each agent picks a strategy probabilistically for the round.
- It plays a 4-shots IPD game with each of its neighbors.

#### **Individual** adaptation:

 At the end of the round, agents increase the probability of the strategy of their most successful neighbors.
 Probabilities are normalized.

Note the convergence properties of the approach.


#### Context-Preservation Revisited: The Case of Individual Learning #3



On a 2-dimensional torus

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
#### Context-Preservation Revisited: The Case of Individual Learning #4



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On a 2-dimensional WS-graph

#### Cooperation *is* Sensitive to Network Structure



#### Cooperation *is* Sensitive to Network Structure Pt. 2

This sensitivity is *not* dependent on initial configuration.

Only to very minor extents.

However, it *is* systematically dependent on the average path length of the underlying network.

These results are independent of the value of the initialization parameter **p**.


# A Speculative Explanation (Needs to be confirmed!!)

Perhaps, the discrete, threshold-like nature of the original model's adaptation rule hinders network-dependence.

There are threshold-like 'spreading models on networks' (e.g., by Watts), but those are 'tipping models' (i.e., do not have the option to 'turn back').

In our model, rare, 'accidental' success of one strategy does not imply an immediate tipping of neighbors.

#### Illustration: Individuals do turn back (Progress is less `smooth')



#### Summary (Not Quite Conclusions!!)

Cooperation, as in the IPD game. Apparent contradiction about the role of network structure

## Context-preservation in cooperation games. With constant-like average degrees.

 Network-sensitivity in discrete choice dynamics.
 A modified model proposed, based on individual adaptation that bridges the gap.